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Leon Battista Alberti’s treatise on architecture, De reaedificatoria (On the Art of Building, c.1450) can beseen as a quintessentially Renaissance text in that it
began life as a commentary on an antique source, the De
architectura of Vitruvius.1 But as the current wealth of scho-
larship on Alberti makes clear, to consider his work in the
secondary terms of rebirth is insufficient. Alberti’s treatise
founded a genuinely new view of the discipline of building
and marks a transition in thought that appears ever more
marked over time. De re aedificatoria is now celebrated as
an ”instaurational” rather than a ”restaurational” text.2
This article will consider the revolutionary claims made
in De re aedificatoria about the status of the architect. Most
radically Alberti identified the architect as a figure “semi-
divine”, and established the idea that a meaningful autho-
rial relation can be sought between an architect and a buil-
ding. From this identification three factors are put in place
that have proved central to later discourse about architec-
ture: an emphasis on the faculty of judgement, on the idea of
authorship, and on the issue of representation. Since Alberti,
architects have staked their claims, defended their terri-
tories and maintained their status through arguments that
find their locus in one or all of these areas. At the same time
these categories establish an uncertainty surrounding the
role of the architect that the profession has never escaped.
In providing an historical account of the origin of these
concepts, one can create a platform from which to address
contemporary challenges to which the discipline is subject,
particularly the problematic issue of interpreting intention
in architecture.
The architect and his model
De re aedificatoria suggests the architect must use his intellect
to order events in the world.3 In doing so he is able to
articulate a “divine sense of beauty” and this, Alberti main-
tains, is his primary aim.4 Building is seen in Alberti’s text as
the medium through which that beauty can be sensed.
Directly, then, one is invited to discover in the phenomenal
object a single valuable quality which is distinct from its
physical presence, and whose existence is evidence of the
will and mind of a (single) “creator”: the architect as author
has arrived. After Alberti’s text the architect will become a
figure open to the scrutiny of the world; and in this sense
De re aedificatoria was a self fulfilling prophesy – simply by
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writing the book the architect’s position changed. Within
the text this change, signalled by the establishment of a
meaningful authorial relation between an “architect” and a
“work” of building, is reinforced by a second assertion. An
architect, Alberti explains, is valued for the judgements he
makes in relation to acts of building, and, conversely, by the
result of such actions he will himself be judged:
He must calculate … the amount of praise, remuneration,
thanks and even fame he will achieve, or conversely…what
contempt and hatred he will receive, and how eloquent, how
obvious, patent and lasting a testimony of his folly he will
leave his fellow men.5
This suggestion, as will be seen, is reciprocal with the idea
of architectural authorship. In both cases the link between
architect and actual, physical building is assumed as secure.
For the authorship function to be valid we have to believe
that what we experience, the reality of the built construc-
tion, reflects exactly that which is willed by the architect;
only in that case can our judgements about him be made
with conviction; only in that case can the value of his judge-
ment be seen. However Alberti goes on to make a final division
which immediately undermines this security, for he claims
that there is a structural distinction between the building as
physical object, over which the builder rules, and the buil-
ding as idea, which is the architect’s province. It becomes
clear that the architect does not “make” buildings; he makes
representations of buildings:
…to make something that appears to be convenient for use,
and that can without doubt be afforded and built as projected,
is the job not of the architect but of the workman. But to
preconceive and to determine in the mind and with judge-
ment something that will be perfect and complete in its every
part is the achievement of such a mind as we seek.6
Alberti’s claims, quoted it must be noted from a twentieth
century translation by three architects, fit our contem-
porary model of the architect extremely closely, not least in
their contradictory nature. But this type of claim on Alberti’s
part must have appeared radical when his text appeared. No
one before had made such claims about the judgement of
the designers of buildings, unless such figures had other so-
lid semi-divine credentials (King Solomon would be a good
example).7 Antique precedent, exemplified in Vitruvius,
had nothing to say on such matters as the divinity of the
architect’s judgement; medieval Master Builders were valued
for their experience rather than their genius.8 While it may
have been accepted that a cathedral could reveal the inspi-
ration of god over its builder, that is a subtly different thing
from suggesting that the author of any building, sacred or
not, might aspire to articulate something divine. Where,
one must ask therefore, did Alberti find the model for his
comments about the figure of the architect? The image
Alberti projects in De re aedificatoria was not immediately
present in the culture of building Alberti would have known,
but neither was it a complete invention. Its origins appear
to lie in the discipline of Law, the field that shaped Alberti’s
early perspective.9
Judgement
If the architect is to be considered an author, then it can be
suggested that this status is traded on a hidden analogy with
the judge. This inference can be drawn through textual ana-
lysis of De re aedificatoria, of Alberti’s texts on painting (De
pictura, 1435) and on the Law itself (De iure, c. 1436), and
through comparison with the documented traditions that
pertained to the Law during Alberti’s period.10 In the fifteenth
century the judge was understood as a figure privileged
with the ability see beyond the confines of the mundane to a
divine set of relationships that underlie earthly matters.11
Alberti attributes to the architect the same power to see
beyond the world of appearances and to act according to
some superior, unseen, and ideal standard.12 Indeed, in
describing the “Art of Building” Alberti’s reliance on the
discipline of Law appears to be have been extensive.13 Alberti
creates for architecture a distinction between actual buildings
and ideal principles which reflects that between the written
law and the idea of justice; and he adopts for the architect
the characteristics attributed to the judge who is able to
resolve the gap between these two. If the architect, like the
judge, is to ”create something new”,14 to provide approp-
riate remedies to new situations which simultaneously reflect
a divine quality of beauty, then the exact nature of the art of
building must revolve around the figure of the architect
mediating between individual precedents and divine prin-
ciples, between an architectural ius positivum and an ius natu-
ralis. The figure to achieve such a feat would be no mere
builder, but would possess exactly those qualities required
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by Alberti of the judge – he would be what lawyers called a
persona mixta.
Authorship
The connection between the figure of the judge and the
Renaissance idea of the artist was first traced by Ernst Kan-
torowicz. As Kantorowicz pointed out, the judge’s status
was traded on an analogy to the King, for as law givers,
kings and princes were considered personæ mixtæ – part
human, part divine – able to act within the world, but directly
inspired by divine wisdom.15 The King’s authority was in
turn dependent on his reflecting Christ, the principle per-
sona mixta, as a model. In late medieval theory, the lawyer
occupied a unique position in that he was accorded the
ability to genuinely create, to produce something from
nothing, an act of “divination” wholly dependent on his status
as a persona mixta. It was this privilege Kantorowicz argued,
which, more than any other, defined the emergent figure of
the artist in the Renaissance.16
Such fifteenth century claims for the status of the artist
were first made in relation to the art of painting. Several
humanist works reinterpreted classical texts, principally Pliny
and Cicero, to establish a new notion about authorship
among painters. The clearest and most radical of these claims
is contained in Alberti’s own De pictura (On painting, 1434):
”The painter Zeuxis,” Alberti declares “…did not believe
any price could be found to recompense the man who, in
modelling or painting living things, behaved like a god among
mortals [...]”.17 Alberti was one of the first Renaissance writers
to attribute a semi-divine status to the artist as the creator of
works reflecting higher truths. His descriptions of both the
painter and the architect are radical attempts to view the
creators of earthly objects in a new light, and they have radical
consequences for their conception.
The idea that the judgement of an artist is divine carries
with it the notion that this judgement can be measured by
the work he produces. Here De pictura provides the prece-
dent for what Alberti will say in De re aedificatoria:
The virtues of painting therefore are that its masters see their
works admired and feel themselves to be almost like the
creator.18
Similarly the architect, if successful will achieve “fame for
posterity, and glory” from his works.19 In this regard, however,
the choice of the figure of the judge as a model for Alberti’s
description of the architect would begin to have significant
consequences. The authorship function of the judge acknow-
ledged the separation of judgement – the act of deciding –
from execution – the rearrangement of bits of the world
according to this new set of relations (the removal of heads,
the division of lands, the reuniting of persons and property).
The judge’s “authority” is part divine and integral (his pri-
vileged ability to make decisions based on divine justice) and
part earthly and external (the unquestioned assumption that
such judgements will be reflected in execution by others).
Like architecture, justice has to be seen to be done – it requires
an action. But for this to happen the judge relies on a whole
mechanism of authority embedded in law, in canons upheld
by the state or commune; the judge’s authority is as real as it
is vicarious.
Alberti’s figure of the architect aspires to a similar status:
“through his intellect he must invent, through experience
recognise, through judgement select […]”.20 However, at
the same time, it is evident that, as a re-invented figure, the
architect would lack that externally guaranteed authority
that steers events unquestioningly according to the will of the
judge. If the judge “embodies the law”, and if his decisions
cannot be questioned without in turn questioning the autho-
rity of the state, the architect figure hangs free. Alberti’s
description of the god-like painter bypasses any such short-
coming by suggesting an authorial line around judgement
and execution, around the artist and the work. No separa-
tion is to be made in De pictura between the divine seeing of
the artist’s mind and the action of the hand that makes this
judgement visible; metaphorically, judgement and execution
have been merged. 21 But in Alberti’s portrayal of the archi-
tect this assurance in relation to authorship is never esta-
blished. The architect, Alberti tells us, “is no carpenter”; he
does not build. Although he “will hardly be able to avoid
having sole responsibility for all the errors and mistakes
committed by others” he does not even supervise building,
allotting that responsibility to a “zealous, circumspect and
strict clerk of works”.22
Representation
One should pause for a moment to consider the impli-
cations of these statements. In a sense, perhaps the line of
argument is inevitable. The discipline of architecture must
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always accept some kind of separation between the body of
the creator and the mechanisms of execution, purely on the
grounds of physical possibility. This is evident in Alberti’s
own definition:
to realise by construction, whatever can be most beautifully
fitted out for the noble deeds of man, by the movement of
weights and the joining and massing of bodies.23
And certainly the tradition of building would have provided
Alberti with models as to how this separation could be
negotiated in practice. Scholarship on late medieval buil-
ding practice by figures such as Richard Goldthwaite and
Roland Recht has shown that there existed sophisticated
systems for the division of labour, the administration of
contracts and sub-contracts, for all the organisational comp-
lexity required to erect large structures.24 In this context
Alberti’s insistence on the separation of architect and builder
remains disturbing. He could have suggested that the architect
should establish a “workshop” type of practice, such that
the relationship between decision and execution could
be gathered under a single authorial umbrella. This, surely,
is the dominant tradition that building would have provided
as a model.25 The master masons, capomaestri, while they
did not claim divine authority, derived their earthly autho-
rity in much this way – the hands that executed did so un-
der the direct authority of the master. Such a model would
be also close to the way in which a figure such as Filippo
Brunelleschi, who is the single contemporary architect-
figure Alberti praises in his writings, had worked within
the opera of the Duomo of Florence.26 But instead of deve-
loping the implications of this model, Alberti self-con-
sciously sacrifices the physical, or quasi-physical link between
judgement and execution for the statement that the archi-
tect is not a builder.
For Alberti the divinity of the architect’s judgement is to
be read in works created according to his decisions; the
evidence on which we judge is the evidence of the building.
Thus the lack of a sure tie between judgement and execu-
tion constitutes a problem; architects must, if they are to
survive, establish by some means an authority over execu-
tion that they do not have of themselves, per se. Having ta-
ken this turn, Alberti could alternatively have identified the
architect with another source – as a figure, sometimes a
courtier, owing allegiance to, and deriving authority from,
a particular patron. A similarly defined role existed already
in the ingenieri who worked for both city-states and power-
ful families – the Gonzaga in Mantua, the d’Este in Ferrara;
such a description also defines a figure such as Antonio
Averlino who worked later for the Sforza in Milan. These
men were not capomaestri, and were not limited to the thea-
tre of a single building project but gave advice – theoretical
advice – across a wide area for their respective masters. This
model would ensure at one level that execution would follow
the architect’s direction, for in it the architect “represents”
his master, with vicarious authority. Yet at the same time it
challenges the presumption, fundamental to Alberti’s defi-
nition, that the architect will have a claim to personal glory
in the work produced. Alberti’s architect cannot be seen as a
mere “tool” through which a patron realises his desires. He
must remain outside the jurisdiction of a particular patron
and at the same time outside the authoritative position
adopted by a traditional capomaestro over execution.
In order to cover the authoritative gap that results from
this position the Albertian architect will turn increasingly
to rhetoric, both to do all that can be done to exercise influence
without authority and to lay claim to a vicarious authority
through which he can exercise his own judgement (and
although this authority stems from outside himself, the
architect will claim personal glory from the actions taken
according to it). The beginnings of this history are evident
in Alberti’s treatise, as well as in the fragments of correspon-
dence in relation to building that he has bequeathed us.
“To have others” hands execute what you have conceived is
a toilsome business;” he notes in De re aedificatoria, adding
“and who is unaware of the complaints that always greet
any proposal to spend someone else’s money as you think
fit?”27 His letters preserved in relation to the Tempio Mala-
testiano in Rimini and S. Andrea in Mantua show clearly
an architect who is physically separated from the theatre of
construction (both letters are written from Rome) and who
is equally clearly not in absolute control of the projects in
question – he makes appeals to builder and client, not decrees.
What is implicit in the argument of De re aedificatoria,
yet remains invisible in the text, is the potential use of visual
representation as a rhetorical tool. The history of the Renais-
sance architectural treatise, of writing about architecture
for an elite audience, and the history of the use of illustra-
tion in such treatises, can both be seen as tied to the architect’s
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pursuit of influence through rhetoric.28 Through later his-
tory representation has become that piece of partial execu-
tion which the architect can directly control and which is
offered as a guarantee of genius. Its status has become so
central that we can no longer think architecture without it.
This status emerges directly from the uncertainties established
in Alberti’s text; without the awkward gap between judge-
ment and execution, the history of architectural illustration
would never have taken the direction it did. Why, many have
wondered, did Alberti not illustrate De re aedificatoria? The
above analysis suggests that the condition in which we pose
this question, our expectation that architectural texts should
be illustrated, is a repercussion of the formulation of the
architect as a figure that Alberti’s treatise itself contains.
Postscript
Alberti’s claim for the significance of the architect’s judgement
foreshadows, it might be argued, both the rise of, and a central
methodological paradox for, the discipline of architectural his-
tory and criticism. Once the judgement of the architect is a
subject worthy of interrogation, and once the evidence for that
genius is seen to reside in buildings, it becomes possible for
other figures to speculate about intention in relation to the
production of built form. Alberti’s claim for a structural dis-
tinction between the building as physical object, over which
the builder rules, and the building as idea, which is the
architect’s province, produces at the same time an uncertainty
about adducing intention for every building constructed with-
in the history of architecture that developed out of the new
configurations predicted in his treatise. The complexity
of understanding authorial intention in architecture may be
more acute in some cases than others. Where secondary evi-
dence is scarce, for example, or where compositions are frag-
mentary, “disfigured”, mixing different architectural “bodies”
in a system that overreaches the limits of a particular architec-
tural syntax, interrogating the built work for evidence of the
intention of the architect becomes complex. Yet the problem
is really a general one, generated out of the implicit uncertainty
around architectural authorship set up in Alberti’s model. One
could add, to take the other side of a very important coin, that
there is a counter issue: the question of how that same gap
in relation to authorship in architecture is used to sustain
particular interpretations of what intention should be in the
face of building evidence. In this respect the historiographies
of “Alberti’s buildings” constitute textbook examples. The
existing facades of buildings such as the Tempio Malatestiano
in Rimini or the Palazzo Rucellai in Florence are both
fragmentary and asymmetrical compositions, creating poten-
tially paradoxical and intriguing commentaries on ideas
contained in Alberti’s architectural treatise. But because
of the gap posited in Alberti’s definition of the architect,
a long tradition of Renaissance scholarship has been able to
deny such characteristics significance in the interpretation of
the authorial intention behind these facades: characteristics
defined as aberrant by a tradition of analysis can always be
attributed to the limitations of realising the architect’s idea –
to the possibility that what was built was not that which was
planned.
Tim Anstey
School of Architecture
Royal Institute of Technology
Stockholm
tim.anstey@telia.com
Notes
1. All the references to De re aedificatoria in this paper are given
using the most recent English translation, On the Art of Buil-
ding in Ten Books, trans. J. Rykwert, R. Tavernor, N. Leach,
Cambridge Mass. and London: MIT Press, 1988, hereafter
abbrieviated as De re aed. See also Giovanni Orlandi (L.B.
Alberti, L’archittetura, ed. G. Orlandi and P. Portoghesi, 2
vols, Milan: Ed. E. Polifio, 1966), and the facsimile of the 1485
edition prepared by Hans-Karl Lücke (Hans-Karl Lücke, Alberti
24 Nordisk Arkitekturforskning 2003: 4
Index: Leon Battista Alberti, De re Aedificatoria (Florence, 1485),
4 vols, Munich: Prestel, 1975–).
2. This case is put most eloquently by Francoise Choay, The
Rule and the Model, English trans. of La Règle et le Modèle,
Cambridge Mass. and London: MIT Press, 1997, pp. 65–135.
3. De re aed., Introduction, p. 3.
4. Ibid., VII, 3, p. 156.
5. Ibid., IX, 10, p. 315.
6. Ibid.
7. Alberti’s treatise is distinctive in identifying royal figures such
as Solomon as exemplars for its model of the architect, and
noticeable also for the limited use it makes of antique archi-
tects as exemplary figures. On these matters, particularly on
the implications of Alberti’s choice of exemplars, see Liisa
Kanerva, Defining the Architect in Fifteenth-Century Italy.
Exemplary architects in L.B. Alberti’s De re aedificatoria,
Helsinki: Soumalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1998, pp. 38–88.
8. The classic account of the changes in the status of the archi-
tect in the early Renaissance is to be found in Richard A.
Goldthwaite, The Building of Renaissance Florence. An Eco-
nomic and Social History, Baltimore and London: The John
Hopkins University Press, 1980. On comparative practices
and the role of the master builder in medieval society in other
parts of Europe, see Roland Recht, ed., Les bâtisseurs des
cathedrals gothiques, Strasbourg: Les Musées de la Ville de
Strasbourg, 1989, and, by the same author, Le dessin d’archi-
tecture: origine et functions, Paris: A. Biro, 1995. Wolfgang
Schöller, “Le dessin d’architecture a l’epoque gothique”, in
Roland Recht, ed., op.cit., pp. 227–237, questions assum-
ptions often made about the role of master masons, empha-
sising the difference between their role and what we would
now consider to be the role of the architect. See also Robert
Branner, “Villard de Honnecourt, Archimedes and Chartres”,
Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians 19, 1960, pp.
91–96, for an interpretation of the significance of Villard’s
body of architectural drawings in relation to this question.
9. Alberti was educated for the law. He spent five years (1421–
1426) at the University of Bologna studying for the degree of
doctor utriusque iuris, of canon and civil law, and also pro-
duced a text on the subject, De iure, written in 1436. The
impact of the discipline of Law over humanist culture in
fifteenth century Italy has been traced by, among others,
Ernst Kantorowicz in the numerous essays included in Selected
Studies by Ernst H. Kantorowicz, Locust Valley, N.Y: J. J.
Augustin, 1965, and Donald R. Kelly in The Human Measure.
Social Thought in the Western Legal Tradition, Cambridge,
Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1990. See also
Robert Jacob’s study of the imagery of justice and its broader
cultural significance in Images de la Justice, Paris: Le Léopard
d’Or, 1994.
10. For a detailed development of this argument see T.A. Anstey,
“Divinity and Difference: On Unity and Distortion in the work
of Leon Battista Alberti”, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of
Bath, 1999.
11. L.B. Alberti, De pictura [1434] is printed in Leon Battista
Alberti. On Painting and On Sculpture. The Latin Texts of De
Pictura and De statua, trans. and ed. C. Grayson, London:
Phaidon, 1972; Della Pittura [1435] in Leon Battista Alberti.
Opere volgari, ed. C. Grayson, Bari: G. Laterza, 1973, vol. 3,
pp. 5–107. The quotations here are taken from the later edi-
tion of Grayson’s translation, L.B. Alberti, On painting, trans.
C. Grayson (1972), London: Penguin, 1991.
12. See E. Kantorowicz, ”The Sovereignty of the Artist”, op. cit.,
pp. 357–362.
13. See T.A. Anstey, op. cit., pp. 44–82.
14. For the significance of newness in fifteenth century culture
generally see Christine Smith, Architecture in the Culture of
Early Humanism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992,
pp. 88–97.
15. See generally Ernst Kantorowicz, The Kings Two Bodies, Prin-
ceton N.J: Princeton University Press, 1957. On Alberti’s ha-
bit of referring to judge/ruler figures from antiquity as ex-
emplars for his figure of the architect see Liisa Kanerva, op.
cit., pp. 38–62.
16. For a background discussion see Kantorowicz, ”The Sove-
reignty of the Artist”, op.cit., pp. 357–362.
17. De pict., II, 25, p. 61, author’s emphasis. See Baxandall, Giotto
and the Orators, Oxford, 1991: Oxford University Press, esp. p.
38 on Alberti’s reuse of antique sources in formulating his argu-
ments, and for the general history of this in Humanism.
18. Ibid.
19. De re aed., IX, 11, p. 318.
20. Ibid., IX, 10, p. 315.
21. A similar merging in relation to judgement and execution
occurs for the majority of the exemplary figures chosen by
Alberti in De re aedificatoria. These are often rulers – kings,
queens, princes – figures for whom the continuity between
judgement and execution is, of course, certain: they are defined
both as semi-divine and wield absolute earthly authority over
the acting bodies of their subjects. Such examples may define a
projected authority for which the architect might strive, but
they serve to illustrate also the conceptual problem Alberti
must have had in advancing his construction. On Alberti’s
use of rulers as exemplars, see Liisa Kanerva, op. cit., pp. 38–62.
22. De re aed., Introduction, p. 3; IX, 11, p. 318.
23. Ibid., Introduction, p. 3.
24. See generally Goldthwaite, op. cit.
25. Ibid. The records Goldthwaite examines suggest that, in four-
teenth and early fifteenth century Italy, where the role of de-
signer of a building is identified, this role coincides with for-
mal responsibility as leader of the opera, that is to say of the
actual building operation. This figure, at least in the context
of fourteenth century Italy, was responsible to the patron or
building committee, if the opera was part of a state or church
Tim Anstey: Authorship and Authority … 25
controlled project (for example, the opera of the Duomo in
Florence). This traditional model implies an automatic autho-
rial link between “design” and execution, the leader of the
opera controlling the project rather in the way that a painter
or goldsmith would retain authority over the hands in his shop.
It is this model that Albert’s formulation appears to disturb.
26. Ibid. For the reference to Brunelleschi see L.B. Alberti, De
pictura, op. cit., Dedication, pp. 34–35. On Filippo Brunel-
leschi see Eugenio Battisti, Brunelleschi, [Milan: Electa, 1972]
London: Thames and Hudson, 1981.
27. De re aed., IX, 11, 318.
28. A beginning to this process can be witnessed, possibly, in the
writings of Francesco di Giorgio Martini, which begin in the
middle of his career when he is already established as inge-
niere in Siena, but shortly before he moves into a wider,
courtly, context. Directly one entertains the possibility that
Francesco di Giorgio’s texts helped establish his credentials in
this new theatre, one is attributing a function to them similar
to that outlined above.
